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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to clarify some of the 
misunderstandings which presently exist as to the proper role 
of the nonprofit corporation in the research, development, 
and implementation of the Air Force electronic systems. 
During the years following World War II, the Air 
Force found it necessary to develop, produce and install 
highly sophisticated electronic systems to command and con-
trol the radically new weapons being conceiyed. All the 
scientific skills reouired to engineer and implement these 
systems did not, and still do not, exist within the military 
and civil service components of the Air Force. 
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To augment its capabilities, the Air Force originally 
relied upon the scientific and technical laboratories of the 
leading universities of the country, and upon the resources 
of private industry. However, in recent years a new approach 
has come into being in the form of the federally sponsored 
nonprofit corporation. The prime purpose of this new nonprofit 
is to provide the skills which the government requires during 
this modern technological era but which it has been unable to 
recruit and retain within the military and civil service. 1 
During their initial phases, the electronic systems 
nonprofits acted as technical advisors to the military and 
provided computer programming services. Their responsibilities 
did not include management nor, to any great extent, system 
engineering or design for the programs which they supported. 
As the nonprofits grew in size and experience, the 
Air Force increased its reliance on their capabilities and 
increased the scope of their activities. It is planned 
that on future electronic systems being developed, the non-
profit corporation's responsibilities may include advanced 
system analysis and planning including feasibility and cost 
studies, system engineering and design, technical evaluation 
of contractor bid proposals, and general technical supervision 
during production, installation and test. The nonprofit 
MITRE corporation is becoming a vital part of the Electronic 
Systems Division which links the military using commands and 
the producing industry. 
This expanded role of the nonprofit in support 
of the Air Force, especially in the systems engineering and 
design areas, results in a rather drastic change to the manage-
ment philosophy of the electronics area. As the Honorable 
Brockway McMillan, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, 
Research and Development, stated in an address on June 26, 
1961: 2 
In the past each command and control system 
was developed by a prime contractor who managed 
the system development, performed the overall 
design, and even prepared the operational 
specification. It is not likely that we will 
continue this practice. We shall rely on 
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systems competence available to the Electronic 
Systems Division at Hanscom Field for systems 
specification, and we will select contractors 
to be implementors of hardware rather than 
basic systems designers. 
This new use of the nonprofit as part of the 
military management team has resulted in considerable con-
troversy in both industry and government. Critics believe 
that the government can do most of the jobs being done by 
nonprofits less expensively and better by using private in-
dustry.3 Industry not only resents the loss of the work being 
done by the nonprofits, but fears the influence they will have 
in directing overall government spending. There are loud 
cries that the nonprofits are pirating the scientific manpower 
resources of private industry with high salaries and other 
benefits. It is also feared that the trend toward nonprofits 
will result in their eventually acauiring all future government 
research and development contracts. 4 
Industry is not alone in its criticism of the 
growing nonprofits. An article in the Harvard Business Re-
view refers to them as a "new form of government entrepreneur-
ship" which provides a new competitor to U. S. business and 
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"more significantly reflects a conclusion by government officials 
that they cannot entrust projects vital to national defense ••• 
to profit-making enterprises!"5 
The government itself is not overjoyed by all 
aspects of the child which it has spawned. Unfair competi-
tion with the government and nonsubsidized concerns has been 
indicated by Congressional studies.6 Three separate investi-
gations are now underway by the House Armed Services Committee, 
the Defense Department and a special committee set up by 
President Kennedy. 7 Also, an Air Force policy statement on 
nonprofits was recently issued by Air Force Secretary, Eugene 
M. Zukert, setting broad guidelines under which nonprofits 
are to operate.8 
In this paper the author has attempted to show the 
historical growth and importance of the electronic systems, 
the evolution of systems management, the parallel growth of 
the capabilities of both the nonprofit corporations and 
industry in this field, and some conclusions and recommendations 
as to the place the nonprofit corporations can and should 
hold in electronic systems management. Research was primarily 
concerned with the use of the conventional profit corporation 
versus the nonprofit as the Air Force's technical advisor and 
management associate in electronic systems development and 
implementation. 
In the preparation of this thesis an intensive 
effort was made to gather information available on the subject 
from military documents, regulations, and histories; Congres-
sional reports and hearings on military systems management; 
reports and recommendations of various study groups; informa-
tion made available by nonprofit corporations and industry; 
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pertinent speeches by high level personnel; and articles 
appearing in various periodicals, trade journals and news-
papers. The author also made use of his intimate working 
association with various aspects of electronic systems manage-
ment from 1955 until the present time. From these sources 
a history of Air Force systems management, the nonprofit 
corporations and industry systems management was compiled 
and generall overall views were formulated. After familiar-
izing himself with the subject, the author interviewed manage-
ment personnel from industry, from the nonprofits, and from 
the military. 
The author wishes to thank all those who ungrudg-
ingly contributed large amounts of their time and a great 
amount of material appearing in this thesis. However, the 
manner of presentation as well as the conclusions and recommen-
dations are those of the author and are not to be construed 
as representing the views of the Air Force or any other agency 
or group. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS 
Definition of Electronic Systems 
In order to discuss electronic systems and their 
management, it will be necessary to define clearly what, in 
Air Force parlance, is meant by an electronic system. Elec-
tronic systems are usually classified as either Command and 
Control Systems or Support Systems and are defined in Air 
Force regulations as follows: 9 
Command and Control System. A composite of 
equipment, skills, and techniques which, while 
not an instrument of combat, is capable of 
performing the clearly defined function of 
enabling a commander to exercise continuous 
control of his forces and weapons in all situa-
tions by providing him with (a) the information 
needed to make operational decisions and (b) 
the means of disseminating their decisions. 
A complete system includes all subsystems, re-
lated facilities, equipment, material, services, 
and personnel reauired for operation of the 
system, so that it can be considered a self-
sufficient unit in its intended operational 
environment. 
Support System. A composite of equipment, skills, 
and techniques which, while not an instrument 
of combat, is capable of performing a clearly 
defined function in support of an Air Force 
mission. A complete support system includes all 
related facilities, equipment, material, services, 
and personnel required for operation of the 
system, so that it can be considered as a self-
sufficient unit in its intended operational 
environment. 
Speaking simply, the above military jargon means 
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that an electronic system includes everything necessary to 
do a job for the Air Force. Using the Ballistics Missile 
Early Warning System as an example, the system includes the 
huge radars installed in Alaska, Greenland, and England; the 
large computers and other eauipment reauired to process the 
data; the tremendous communications networks which bring this 
information back to Headquarters, North American Air Defense 
Command (NORAD) at Colorado Springs, Colorado; and the huge 
displays which make this data meaningful and which enable 
NORAD to analyze the situation to make decisions. Also 
included are the buildings, often of special Arctic construc-
tion, reauired to house the men and eauipment, huge reliable 
power plants, special trucks and other vehicles, and at many 
sites airstrips, mess halls, recreation facilities, supply 
warehouses, and the thousand and one other items required 
to live and to operate complicated equipment under difficult 
climatic and geographical conditions. Last, but not least, 
the system includes the men required to operate the system. 
A more detailed example of an electronics system, including 
the management, engineering and logistics required for its 
implementation, is given in the Appendix. 
When speaking of systems, the Electronic Systems 
Division (ESD) usually refers only to those systems which, 
because of high priority, have been assigned to ESD for special 
management. 
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The Systems 
At the present time, although new requirements for 
systems are constantly being generated, the following systems 
are considered in the priority special management category 
and are in various stages of study, development, or imple-
mentation: 
412L - Air Weapons Control System 
An overseas theater tactical air weapons control and 
warning system. 
413L - DEW Line 
A distant early warning system for detecting hostile 
air-breathing threats approaching the North American 
continent from the north. 
416L - SAGE Air Defense System 
A semi-automatic air weapons control and warning 
system for detecting, identifying, tracking, and provid-
ing interceptor-weapon direction against air-breathing 
threats to the United States and Canada. 
425L - NORAD Combat Operations Center 
A system which collects, processes, and displays data 
to assist the Commander in Chief, North American Air 
Defense Command (NORAD) in commanding and controlling 
his forces. 
431L - Traffic Control and Landing Systems 
A program to satisfy Air Force traffic control require-
15 
ments by working with the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) 
and in the development of equipment peculiar to Air 
Force needs. 
433L - Weather Observation and Forecasting System 
A global semi-automatic electronic system for observ-
ing, forecasting, and handling weather information. 
It is being developed in conjunction with FAA and the 
u. s. Weather Bureau. 
438L - Intelligence Data-Handling System 
A system for high-speed processing of world-wide 
intelligence data. 
465L - Strategic Air Command and Control System 
A system which collects, processes, and displays data 
to assist the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command 
(SAC) in commanding and controlling his forces. 
466L - Electromagnetic Intelligence System 
A worldwide system for collecting intelligence by 
electromagnetic means and processing for transmission 
to users. 
473L - Air Force Control System 
A data processing and display system to assist Head-
quarters USAF in making command decisions. 
474L - Ballistic Missile Early Warning System 
A system to provide early warning of a mass ICBM 
attack on the North American Continent from the north. 
16 
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477L - Nuclear Detection System 
A system to provide NORAD and other military and civilian 
agencies with essential information on nuclear detonation. 
480L - Air Communications System 
A system to assure inter- and intrasystem communica-
tions services to support global Air Force operations. 
496L - Space Track 
A system for detecting, tracking, identifying, and 
cataloging orbiting objects. 
CHAPTER III 
SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT 
Because of the complexity of modern electronic 
systems, the years of lead time required to implement a 
system, the extensive resources of men, material and money 
involved (which in some cases runs into billions of dollars), 
and the critical need to get systems operational at the earl-
iest date practical, it was mandatory that the Air Force set 
up special management procedures for certain designated high 
priority systems.10 Management is normally further complicated 
by system requirements which demand the latest state of the 
art and require a development production program. New con-
cepts may also emerge and breakthroughs occur which can cause 
significant changes in the middle of the program. 
It was not practical to assume that all the various 
functional organizations of the Air Force concerned with 
plans, operations, research, development, procurement, produc-
tion, supply, maintenance, personnel and finance would all 
devote the priority of attention required at the proper time 
and in a coordinated manner to insure that a critically needed 
system came into being on the required tight-time schedule. 
Also in the picture are the one or more contractors utilized 
to develop, technically integrate, and/or procure the required 
hardware and facilities. 11 
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The System Program Office 
To achieve the desired management, the Air Force 
has set up special management offices for each designated 
system called System Program Offices (SPO's). The System 
Program Director who heads up the SPO is responsible for 
planning, organizing, integrating, and monitoring the activ-
ities of all the Air Force functional agencies participating 
in the system program and directing them as required to achieve 
the desired goal. 12 In addition, this office is the official 
contact point with all contractors working on the system and 
works directly with the contractors to get the job done. 13 A 
SPO may number only a handful during the initial study phase 
of a program, grow to a hundred or more during the main develop-
ment and production effort, and gradually phase down as the 
system nears completion. A typical SPO organization is shown 
in Figure 1 although organizational structure is not rigid 
and varies with the job to be done. 
The Electronic Systems Division 
No Air Force unit is without its headquarters, and 
the SPO's are no exception. Gathered together under a Deputy 
for Systems Management, the Electronic System Program Offices 
are part of the Electronic Systems Division at Lawrence G. 
Hanscom Field, Bedford, Massachusetts, whose organizational 
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chart is shown in Figure 2. This headquarters provides guidance, 
direction and staff and technical assistance to the SPO's 
FIGURE 1 
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and reports directly to the Air Force Systems Command which 
has responsibility for ballistic missile, space, and aircraft 
systems as well as electronic systems. 
System Program Office-Industry Relationships 
While the System Program Office has responsibility 
for overall systems management, industry plays a very major 
role in the engineering, development, production and imple-
mentation oFevery electronic system. In the SPO-Industry 
relationship the SPO performs the dual function of supervising 
the contractor's activities while at the same time acting 
as the source through which the contractor secures Air Force 
and other government resources required to do the job. The 
SPO on the one hand directs the efforts of the contractor 
and insures that quality performance is received. On the 
other hand it acts as a service organization for the con-
tractor when he needs government equipment, supplies, trans-
portation, facilities, and most of all, money to do the job. 
In most cases a very close and harmonious SPO-
Industry relationship is built up with each organization's 
efforts complementing the efforts of the other. This team 
effort is mandatory if the system is to be built expeditiously 
and economically. The SPO has overall system management 
responsibility, and the most important asset for accomplishing 
the job has been its contractor resources. 
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Contractor Responsibilities 
Contractual arrangements between the Air Force and 
industry vary greatly from system to system. This is due not 
only to the differing requirements of the various systems, 
but also because ofi the evolution which has taken place in 
systems management concepts and philosophy in the years since 
1954 when Project uffices were formed and in 1Y55 colocated 
with the contractor for management of the two first major 
post-World War II systems (SAGE and DEW Line). 
In most cases a prime contractor was selected who 
had overall responsibility to engineer, design, and implement 
the system to meet the operational requirements. Included 
in the implementation was the in-house production or procure-
ment from subcontractors of all equipment, supplies and 
services not furnished by the government, the installation 
of the eauipment, the testing of the system, and the training 
of the people reauired to operate the system. 
In certain cases the contractor manufactures the 
majority of the eauipment reauired for the system, and in 
these programs the system becomes almost completely oriented 
around the equipment which the prime contractor produces. 
In other cases the prime contractor is more objective and 
fabricates none or only a small portion of the eauipments 
used, while subcontracting or securing from the government 
the majority of items required for the job. In the SAGE 
program the Western Electric Company has a management con-
23 
tract for scheduling and testing the system, while the system 
design and engineering were performed by the Lincoln Labora-
tories, MITRE, and other agencies, and all the major equipments 
are procured under separate contracts by the Air Force. 
Because of the size and complexity of today's 
electronic systems, only the largest corporations in our 
country have the resources of experience, qualified personnel, 
facilities, and capital required of a prime contractor. The 
latest list of industry currently employed by the Air Force 
24 
for these ventures includes Western Electric and its technical 
partner Bell Telephone Laboratories, Radio Corporation of 
America, General Electric, International Business Machines, 
International Telephone and Telegraph, Burroughs Corporation, 
United Aircraft, and Aeronutronic, a Ford Motor Company division. 
CHAPTER IV 
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
What System Engineering Is 
A major and crucial portion of the electronic 
systems management effort, which industry stands in jeopardy 
of losing to the nonprofit, is system engineering. This is 
a term used to describe the engineering necessary to determine 
and integrate all the various equipments reauired to make 
a complete operating system. The system engineer must de-
termine which equipments presently in being, or which the 
latest state-of-the-art indicates can be developed and pro-
duced within the allowable time schedule, will best meet 
the operational reauirements of the intended user and are 
within the resources allowable for the system. 
The system engineering group must first decide 
upon possible approaches, so that it can be determined if 
sufficient fundamental knowledge exists to enable the reali-
zation of the goals desired. uf several possible approaches 
which may meet this initial requirement, the system engineer 
must decide which will best meet the overall objectives 
desired, including a time schedule and economic factors. To 
do this job, the system engineer must have an intimate know-
ledge of research and development presently being carried 
on in the various technical areas from which contributions 
to the system can be expected. In addition he must have a 
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complete understanding of equipments now in being and must 
be well aware of the operational applications for which the 
system will be used. 14 
After determining the approach to be used, the 
system engineer must decide which equipments presently avail-
able can be used and what development programs must be in-
itiated for new eauipments. 15 He must be sure that all 
the equipments or subsystems will integrate and properly 
function as a system and what modifications if any will be 
required to accomplish this. He must also be aware of inter-
face accommodations required to insure that the new system 
will operate with other systems. 
Determining what goes into the system is just the 
beginning of the system engineer's job. He is the guidance 
and control mechanism which coordinates all portions of the 
system through development, production, installation and 
. 16 f test1ng. I problems occur whose resolution requires new 
developments, he ascertains the impact which a newly designed 
subsystem will have on the overall system. If new scientific 
breakthroughs occur in areas where the system is concerned, 
the system engineer determines their applicability both tech-
nically and economically. After the system is installed and 
in its early operational stages, the systems engineer is 
still called upon to work out the ttbugs" or "growing pains" 
which occur in every new system. 
26 
The Controvers~ 
Since the responsibility of the system engineer is 
the technical planning and control of the system, it is easy 
to see why industry does not wish to lose this all important 
function. Industry believes that it must retain this respon-
sibility if it is to implement a system coherently. The major 
electronic companies have developed a large capability in 
defense oriented systems engineering during the past decade 
at great expense to the government. This experience and 
talent, they say, can do the system engineering job both 
better and at less cost than a newly created nonprofit. From 
an overall defense standpoint the government cannot afford 
to disregard this capability. 
The proponents of the federally sponsored nonprofits 
claim that there must be greater objectivity in system engin-
eering. Their contention is that a profit minded corporation 
cannot be trusted to place the defense systems needs above 
that of the corporation. They feel that in engineering a 
system, industry would be prone to favor company produced 
equipment at the expense of the system. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE RISE OF THE NONP~FIT CORPORATION 
Early History 
The United States government let its first contract 
with a nonprofit organization over 130 years ago when in 1830 
the Franklin Institute of Philadelphia was given a contract 
to study the causes of boiler explosions. The results of 
this study could not be established by the writer; however, 
the significance of this contract was not in the results 
obtained but rather the precedence established in the use of 
a nonprofit contractor by the government. The reason for 
utilizing a nonprofit organization in 1830 was the same reason 
given for the great use of nonprofits today. The government 
did not have on its payroll the talent required nor did it 
possess laboratories to conduct highly essential research. 17 
A forerunner of the role currently being played 
by nonprofits working for the Air Force was a flying machine 
development contract with Samuel Langley and the Smithsonian 
Institute in 1898. This contract was more historical from a 
nonprofit standpoint than for results achieved. History says 
that the project ended in disaster just nine days before the 
first Wright brothers flight at Kitty Hawk in 1903. 18 
Post World War II Nonprofits 
Over the years, and particularly since World War II, 
the utilization of our colleges and universities for government 
28 
research has grown to be a way of life for both the educational 
institutions of the country and most government agencies. In 
fact, the huge amounts of research money made available 
since World War II have greatly altered the character of most 
of our leading universities. 1~ As a case in point, Doctor 
J. A. Stratton states in his Report of the President 1~61 
that during fiscal year 1~61 the cost of operating M. I. T.'s 
three government laboratories alone amounted to a staggering 
fifty-seven million dollars.20 
Although the university contract approach has a 
rather long history, the technological expansion since World 
War II has spawned a new type of nonprofit. These organiza-
tions, now numbering over 350,21 are in many cases spin 
offs from universities or industry and now operate as com-
pletely separate entities under a nonprofit charter. often 
sponsored directly by the government, and for practical 
purposes completely dependent upon government contracts, this 
modern nonprofit corporation is in fact a direct extension 
of the government. 
The nonacademically aligned nonprofit has become 
a convenient method of hiring high caliber brainpower which 
~he government has not been able to assemble in the military 
or civil service because of pay scales, manpower ceilings, and 
other influences. These new corporations are now performing 
many tasks which until recently would have been considered 
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strictly within the realm of government staff work or a job 
for a private contractor.22 
The Electronic Systems Nonprofits 
While volumes could be written on the many non-
profits, this paper will limit itself to the few which most 
directly influence electronic systems management. These 
include the RAND Corporation which formed the basic pattern 
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for other government sponsored corporations, the Systems 
Development Corporation which spun off RAND to do operational 
research, human engineering and programming for the Air Force's 
Air Defense Command, and the MITRE Corporation currently 
providing engineering support for the Air Force's Electronic 
Systems Division. Aerospace Corporation must also be mentioned 
for, while engaged in missile and space work, it has gained 
tremendous attention from congressional investigations, industry 
controversy, and nationwide publicity. Because of this it 
has become the Air Force policy setter for nonprofits. 
RAND 
The post World War II use of the nonacademically 
aligned nonprofit was first emphasized by the now famous 
RAND Corporation which was established in Santa Monica, 
California in 1946. This "think factory," which was originally 
a part of the Douglas Aircraft Company, now employs a scien-
tific staff of approximately 850 working primarily on Air 
Force contracts.23 
Its studies range from military strategy and tactics 
to disarmament, political analysis, and economics. Among 
RAND's many programs was extensive work done for the Air 
Defense Command in t:be operational and training areas. This 
program included extensive computer applications and man-
... 
machine studies which were later to play an important part 
in the history of RAND. 
RAND's influence is not limited to its prolifi<: 
outpouring of reports. Its representation on approximately 
seventy separate government committees insures ~hat RAND 
thinking is well disseminated in many areas.24 
Although dependent ·upon government contracts for 
about 80 per cent of its $13.5 million annual budget, RAND 
assumes a very independent attitude and insists that it not 
be contractually obligated to undertake work which it doesn't 
consider worthwhile. RAND, in being the pioneer in its field, 
has been a model for many of the nonprofits which are following 
in its footsteps and its influence is further felt through 
interlocking trusteeships.* 
Sxstems Development Corporation 
Because of its broad knowledge of air defense opera-
tions and its experience in computer usage relative to air 
defense problems gained under former Air Force contracts, the 
*A board of trustees guides the nonprofit in much the same way 
that a board of directors serves a conventional corporation. 
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RAND Corporation was asked in 1955 further to analyze Air 
Defense Command's operations, develop system operational 
specifications, and develop computer programs for the new 
highly sophisticated and computerized Semi-Automatic Ground 
Environment (SAGE) system being developed by MIT's Lincoln 
Laboratories and other agencies. 
Immediately recognizing the magnitude of this task, 
RAND agreed to undertake it with the understanding that, as 
the program evolved, a separate nonprofit corporation would 
be formed to take over this new job. Originally established 
as a RAND division and colocated with Lincoln Laboratories 
at Hanscom Field, Massachusetts, and since 1958 relocated 
in Santa Monica, California, the Systems Development Corpora-
tion (SDC) spun off from its parent in 1957 and since then 
has assembled the largest professional group in the country 
skilled in operational analysis and computer programming. 
As indicated in Table I, SDC's staff is concentrated 
in the four major professions of human factors, data process-
ing, engineering, and operations research. Included in these 
categories are such disciplines as applied mathematics, 
aeronautics, sociology, physics, geography, statistics, human 
engineering, and electronics. In January 1961 SOC's staff 
included 182 Ph.D.'s, 327 with masters degrees, and 1159 
holding bachelor degrees. 
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TABLE I 
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 
Level or Degree by Skill Area 
and 
Number or People 
Skill Area PhD MA BA 
Human Factors 117 102 176 
Data Processing 2 67 586 
Engineering 2 31 68 
Operations Research 19 45 55 
Administration & Others 42 15 133 
Non - Exempt* 7 144 
182 327 1159 
No Degree Total 
38 433 
315 967 
14 115 
12 131 
141 391 
1356 1507 
1876 3544 
*Exempt employees are proressional, supervisory and management 
personnel not eligible ror overtime p·ay. 
Source - System Development Corporation 
Date - 6 January 1961 
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To recruit and hold this type of professional talent 
a working environment has been created which includes a salary 
structure competitive with private industry and an atmosphere 
more in keeping with an academic organization. With its 
professional personnel in mind, it has established fringe 
benefits which include such items as sabbatic vacations, 
educational assistance, and support for participation in 
professional societies and publication in journals. 
SDC has remained active in air defense training and 
computer programming since its formation; however, the work 
effort on this program should decline since the last SAGE 
sector became operational in December 1961. 
Although formed to perform an air defense mission, 
SDC has not remained solely in that field. Because of its 
uniaue capabilities, it has also accepted contracts for other 
system development projects including both government contracts 
and subcontracts to prime industrial contractors engaged in 
systems work. SDC's growth into these other areas is dramat-
ically illustrated in Figure 3. 
Another indication of the size of the SDC effort 
can be realized by an examination of its financial statements 
which, for fiscal year 1~61, show cost plus fixed fee con-
tracts totaling $41,236,053 on which a fee of $2,285,720 was 
realized. The nonprofit corporation of today is big business! 
ln;addition to its strictly military connected 
functions, SDC also conducts basic research in computer pro-
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FIGURE 3 
SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION RESPONSIBILITIES 
Some of the areas wherein SOC has worked contract-
ually for government agencies, directly or indirectly 
in completed or outgoing tasks of system development. 
ADC - Air Defense ComtllW1d ,- ·Manual, then Semi-Automatic 
GrOund Environment (SAGE) (416L) - Computer Programming and 
System Training. 
NORAD-CPX - North American Air Defense Command - Total System 
Exercises - Simulation Project. 
USA-HUGHES - U. S. Army wi~h Hughes Aircraft - U. S. Army 
Signal Corps -· Development·· and Testing of Signal Corps System. 
SAC-IEC - Strategic Air Command with International Electric 
Corporation (IEC) - SAC ~ntrol System (SACCS} (465L). 
AFCRC - Air Force Cambridge Research Center - SAGE Operator 
Position Study - System and Programming Study. 
DOD-USAF - Department of ·Defense - u. S. Air Force - Weapons 
System Evaluation Group (WSEG) - Simulation Studies. 
FAA - Federal Aviation Agency - Air Traffic Control (ATC) -
I'iitegration of ATC with SAGE • 
. ~ j 
FAA-MITRE - Federal Aviation Agency with MITRE - SAGE Air 
Traffic Integration (SATIN) - Computer Programming, Experimenta 
System Design. 
USAF - United States Air Force - Canadian Air Defense System 
Training - Simulation Exercises. 
DCA-PHILOO - Defense Communication Agency with Philco - Defense 
National Communication Control System - Programming, System 
Analysis and Assistance. 
AFSC - Air Force Systems Command - Electronic Intelligence (ELil 
Automatic Data Processing. 
NORAD-MITRE - North American Air Defense Command with MITRE -
NORAD Command System (425L) - System Requirements and Design. 
Source - Extracted from SOC document BR-1/000/01 

gramming, theory of decision making, statistics, etc. Also 
of a more independent nature is work in automated teaching, 
management control systems, and medical data processing. 
As stated previously, SOC's responsibilities in-
clude performing work as a prime contractor to the government, 
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as a subcontractor to industrial contractors working on govern-
ment contracts, and also as a subcontractor to the MITRE 
Corporation on certain systems. However, recent agreements 
reached indicate that in those areas where SOC's responsibilities 
are required to support the systems engineering and management 
functions on future systems being implemented by the Electronic 
Systems Division, SDC will perform as a subcontractor to MITRE. 
Therefore, in all future references to the nonprofits in 
future systems engineering and management, mention will only 
be made of the MITRE Corporation and it will be assumed that 
this will include SOC as a subcontractor reauired. 
The MITRE Corporation 
The MITRE Corporation was founded in 1958 as a 
spin off from MIT's Lincoln Laboratories for the primary 
purpose of providing technical support to the Air Defense 
Systems Integration Division (ADSID) at Hanscom Field, Mass. 
Originally this work dealt primarily with integrating inter-
ceptors and missiles into the SAGE Air Defense systems and 
other work and studies related to SAGE program. MITRE was 
particularly suited for this task since most of its original 
technical staff had worked on the design and development of 
SAGE and were pioneers in modern military computers and data 
processing technology. 
MITRE soon also became involved in a closely related 
joint Air Force-Federal Aviation Agency sponsored program 
experimentally utilizing the SAGE system for enroute air 
traffic control. 
MITRE's growth and the increased scope of its 
mission since its formation has been closely tied to the 
changing Air Force's organizational structure. The first 
major change ocurred in late 1959 when the responsibility 
for all electronic systems management was moved to Hanscom 
Field and all the scattered system program offices were 
physically relocated at Hanscom early in 1960. MITRE in turn 
became the technical advisor to this expanded organization 
and increased its efforts. Further Air Force reorganization 
in 1961 formed the Electronic Systems Division under the 
newly formed Air Force Systems Command. 
Prior to 1961 most of MITRE's work could be con-
sidered primarily that of a technical consultant. However, 
this role is now being changed to include an enlarged system 
engineering role. Under this new concept MITRE will become 
a management partner with ESD and its tasks are to include 
systems planning, cost studies, operations research, technical 
evaluation of contractors' proposals, system engineering and 
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design control. In August 1961, the Air Force announced MITRE's 
expanded role would first be utilized in the NORAD Operations 
Control Center System (425L). 
As of December 1, 1961, MITRE has built an organ-
ization totaling nearly 1500 people of whom 532 are classified 
as its scientific and technical staff (Figure 4). This 
staff is composed of 40 members with Ph.D. degrees, 184 
holding masters, 279 with bachelors degrees and 25 with no 
degrees but having professional status because of experience 
and past accomplishments. 
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FIGURE 4 
MITRE PERSONNEL GROWTH 
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Source: MITRE Corporation through U. S. Air Force 
Date: December 1, 1961 
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Objectivity 
CHAPTER VI 
CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES 
The principal argument of the proponents of the 
nonprofit as the systems engineer is the objectivity issue. 
The systems engineering group must be completely objective in 
its approach if the Air Force is to develop and produce the 
best electronics systems which the current state of the art 
and possible future developments will allow. The only goal 
must be to engineer the maximum capability into the system 
within the time and resources allowable. No corporate consid-
eration should interfere with the best judgment of the group 
when selecting a path to be followed to optimize the system 
from a technical or economic viewpoint. There must be no 
company bias in selecting subsystems and equipment which will 
be used. Since the nonprofit has no allegiance to any hardware 
producer, he should in theory at least be completely objective 
in his approach. 
A sample of the type of decisions which constantly 
face the system engineer can be simply illustrated by examin-
ing the requirements for a new tropospheric radio communica-
tions system. If the engineering data and path loss tests 
indicate that a vital link of the system will require perform-
ance above that possible with equipments currently being pro-
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duced, several approaches are possible. If topography will 
not permit site changes which will solve the problem, one 
must consider development programs which will provide more 
powerful transmitters, more sensitive receivers or larger 
antennas. Any appreciable improvement in one or more of 
these subsystems may provide the solution. 
42 
In a case such as this, the system engineering group 
must be qualified to survey each of these very specialized 
fields and determine the possible progress which can be expected 
in each area and which development program has the greatest 
chance of success during the time period allowed. ln,addition 
to the electronics problems involved, the system engineer 
must also examine the effect each approach will have on the 
rest of the system. If, for example, it is decided to greatly 
increase the transmitter power, it should be realized that 
this may double the size or number of diesel generators for 
the sites, double operating costs for the life of the system, 
require larger buildings, and induce a radiation hazard which 
may have pofitical as well as health implications. 
It doesn't take much imagination to see that a 
biased engineering group could easily slant its program toward 
a development program which would not be to the best overall 
interests of the Air Force. It is claimed by some that any 
private contractor is inherently biased in those areas where 
his corporation has a development, production or financial 
interest. In the example above, if he has the in-house capa-
bility to develop and produce the powerful transmitter but 
would have to subcontract for a less costly receiver or antenna, 
it is claimed that his natural tendency would be to favor 
the transmitter. 
In addition to this initial engineering, many 
changes are usually required while the system is being imple-
mented. Operational reauirements may chanpe or new technical 
break-throughs occur which would make it desirable to reorient 
a major portion of the program. The system engineer must be 
able to take full advantage of situations of this type. Even 
though the desired changes may adversely affect a certain 
company, this company must not have the prerogative of exert-
ing pressures which will influence the engineers' decisions. 
While it is recognized that the nonprofit will not 
have hardware production considerations to influence him, it 
would be eaually naive to assume that this is complete assurance 
of objectivity. It must be remembered that prior experience 
and education can be the cause of prejudice in the same manner 
as corporate influence. As an example, it has been stated 
that Lincoln Laboratory and MITRE personnel were inordinately 
prejudiced toward that portion of the SAGE System which they 
had been instrumental in developing. In their role of integrat-
ing new eauipments and weapons into SAGE, some claimed that 
the position often taken was that SAGE was inviolate. All 
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equipments and weapons were required to adapt to SAGE regard-
less of the degradation which ensued. Others have stated 
that nonprofit personnel are often so bigoted that they can 
never consider.any solution to a problem but their own. 
In a similar vein, it has been claimed by General 
Medaris of the Army that Ramo-Wooldridge was not objective at 
all in the ballistic missile area and "had a vested interest 
in their own supervised weapons when it came to judging the 
comparative merits of the Air Force and Army systems, and there 
was a time when the General would not allow Ramo-Wooldridge 
employees to visit the arsenal to participate in an Air Force 
evaluation of the Jupiter missile system."25 
The writer will not attempt to establish the validity 
of any of the above allegations but merely uses them to illus- · 
tratethe point. Separating the systems engineering from hard-
ware contracts is not a positive method of establishing objec-
tivity. Rather one has to assume that other things being 
equal, if there are no corparate pressures toward in-house 
hardware production, a greater degree of objectivity should 
exist. 
Elite Technical Capability 
Congress, the Secretary of the Air Force and other 
top agencies concerned with system management have stressed 
that the nonprofit corporations must assemble and maintain 
elite technical staffs if they are to perform properly the 
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highly sophisticated scientific tasks being assigned to them. 
In the electronic systems area MITRE has this responsibility. 
If it is to judge and evaluate the engineering proposals and 
hardware offerings of the entire U. S. electronics industry, 
there can be no place on the MITRE team for the second rate 
engineer. If he is not tops in his field, it will be impossible 
for him to gain the respect and confidence of industry with 
whom he must associate and whom he must guide. Without this 
prestige, the reason for having MITRE as an Air Force tech-
n1cal advisor ceases to exist. 
Although MITRE was not organized until 1958, nearly 
half its engineers and scientists trace their lineage back 
toM. I. T. 1 s Lincoln Laboratories where they participated in 
the design and dev~lopment of the SAGE System. This early 
pioneering background in computer development and military com-
puter applications forms the hard core of the MITRE technical 
strength. 26 MITRE is proud of its original staff which it 
inherited in the spin-off from Lincoln Laboratories. In 
interviews with management, claims are made that its rigid 
recruiting policies are aimed at keeping and have kept the 
quality of personnel at a high level. As indicated in Table 
II, the educational level of their technical staff has re-
mained consistently high and even improved while the number 
of personnel more than doubled in size in thirty-three months. 
In addition to a degree, the college transcripts of candidates 
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TABLE II 
MITRE CORPORATION 
Technical Staf'f 
Comparative Educational Level 
1959 and 1961 
Highest 
Degree J wuary 1, 1959 
Number F-ercent 
Ph.D. 9 4.6 
M. s. 65 33.3 
B s. 113 58.0 
No Degree 8 4.1 
195 100.0 
Source - MITRE Corporation 
Date - December 1, 1961 
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December 1, 1961 
Number Percent 
40 7.5 
184 35.0 
279 52.8 
25 4.7 
528 100.0 
being interviewed for hire must show well above average 
scholastic achievement. Selection of applicants is more 
than a mere review of academic achievement. Table III illus-
trates the weeding out process which takes place in the hiring 
of an individual. 
Since MITRE is a growing organization, advancement 
opportunities are good. ¥resent policy is to promote from 
within if the quality of the in-house individual is equal to 
applicants available from the outside. With its presently 
expanding role, MITRE is actively recruiting personnel at 
practically all levels. In the opinion of the writer this 
type of recruitment is mandatory if MITRE is to achieve the 
elite com~etence to which it lays claim. This should be a 
basic policy, or else serious inbreeding of ideas could easily 
take place, putting MITRE out of step with many advances 
being made in the many faceted area of electronics engineering. 
This would prove disastrous, not only to MITRE, but also, and 
far more importantly, to the Air Force and the Nation. No 
one organization in the country can lay claim to the best 
brains in the engineering field. Unless new people with new 
ideas are brought into the picture from the outside, stagnation 
may occur. 
At least as important as academic background is 
the experience level of the people doing the job. Industry 
would be very sceptical of an organization whose engineers 
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TABLE III 
MITRE Corporation 
Employee Selection ~rocess 
Inquiries and Applications 
Interviews by Invitation 
Offers 
Acceptances 
Source - MITRE Corporation 
Date - Period during 1960-1961 
Number 
4,441 
434 
221 
114 
48 
Percent 
100 
9.8 
5.0 
2.6 
are not dry behind the ears. Education is fine, but it must 
be tempered with experience. A survey of the MITRE structure 
indicates that it has achieved a fairly good balance of ex-
perience as well as academic degrees. Table IV shows that 
over 40 per cent of its staff has ten years or more experience. 
For an organization with aspirations toward management and 
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control of a huge segment of the highly technical electronics 
industry, MITRE's experience level should be raised by outside 
recruitment as rapidly as possible if it is to exert the leverage 
on the industry which its position warrants. 
As to elite capability, the December 16, 1961, issue 
of Business Week quoted a MITRE engineer as follows: 
The fact that MITRE has the cream of u. S. 
engineering talents on its payrolls is justifi-
cation enough of the role it plays. 
This rather brash statement would probably not be 
endorsed by MITRE management. Rather it would probably tend 
to say that MITRE is putting together the most talented en-
gineering organization possible to meet its commitments. MITRE 
should be the first to recognize that many of the commercial 
companies, other nonprofits, and our leading universities 
have equal and often greater capabilities in many if not 
most of the numerous engineering and related areas which are 
encompassed in overall systems engineering work. Less than 
half the technical staff is currently engaged in systems en-
0-4 Years 
De~ Number Per Cent 
Ph.D. 1 
M. S. 51 
B. S. 102 
None 1 
TOTAL 155 
Source - MITRE Corporation 
Date - December 1, 1961 
.2 
9.7 
19.3 
.2 
29.4 
TABLE IV 
MITRE TECHNICAL STAFF 
EXPERIENCE LEVEL 
5-9 Years 10 Years and Over 
Number Per Cent Number Per Cent 
10 1.9 29 5.5 
44 8.3 89 16.9 
83 15.7 94 17.8 
6 1.1 18 3.L~ 
-
143 27.0 230 43.6 
Number 
40 
184 
279 
25 
-
528 
Total 
Per. Cent 
7.6 
34.9 
52.8 
4.7 
-
100.0 
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gineering and design work and the preponderance of their 
effort has been on the SAG.E system where MITRE acts more as 
an Air Force advisor than as a true system engineer. With 
this background it would be difficult for MITRE to claim 
superiority over several of our large corporations who have 
past performance on complicated electronic systems to point 
to with pride. 
MITRE's lack of demonstrated concrete accomplishments 
is a big handicap at this time. While it is true that MITRE 
has acted as the Air Force advisor on many matters and has 
conducted many studies at Air Force request, it is also 
true that it cannot offer many outstanding specific accomp-
lishments on which to hang its hat. Although MITRE has been 
very active in SAG.E, credit for accomplishments in system 
engineering for that program is usually given to Lincoln 
Laboratories rather than MITRE. Prior to gaining full accep-
tance by the Air Force and industry, MITRE must prove itself. 
One big step in the right direction is the recent 
decision to colocate certain MITRE and Air Force personnel 
working on the same projects. Interviews with a number of 
Air Force personnel working with MITRE in this manner all 
indicate a healthy respect for the engineering capabilities 
of the MITR.E personnel with whom they are in contact. It 
appears that familiarity breeds respect when capability is 
demonstrated. To gain a reputation for having an elite staff 
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requires acquiring a mutua~ respec~ at tne engineering and 
lower management ~eve~ as we~~ as indorsement oy top manage-
ment. 
To date MITRE has no~ re~ied so~e~y upon its own 
talents. when tasks nave been asslgned wnlch require ski~~s 
beyond that available in-house, it has resorted to both out-
side consultants and subcontracting. While approving of 
MITRE's use of consultants, the Air Force has recently frowned 
on the large use being made of subcontractor personnel augment-
1ng the ~ITRE technical staff. It was believed that, because 
of the highly sensitive nature of much of the MITRE work, the 
hiring of personnel on a subcontract.basis might give the 
parent company of these personnel undue advantage in future 
contractual dealines. This subcontracting ban does not include 
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the Systems Development Corporation, where such use is encouraged 
to provide its highly essential human engineering and computer 
programming functions. 
Facing the highly competitive engineering market of 
today, MITRE will have a rough time recruiting to meet its 
future large commitments, replace its losses of subcontractor 
people and normal attrition, and still maintain high academic 
standards and experience level. It does not have large 
corporate resources from which to draw experienced people 
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to meet crash projects but must go out on the open market to 
bid for people. Any attempt to raise its pay level and fringe 
benefits much above those of competitive industry will bring 
about even greater cries of pirating and more congressional 
and other governmental inquiries. The question is: How 
else can MITRE discharge its responsibility of providing the 
best engineering assistance available? 
Greater Lnowledge of ~rivileged Information 
MITRE's distinct advantage over commercial concerns 
is its. privileged position with the government. Since MITRE 
is considered part of the Air Force team, it has access to 
much highly classified and sensitive information which cannot 
be made available to contractors. MITRE is working actively 
with the Air Force on advanced systems analysis and planning, 
intersystem integration, applied research programs and foreign 
technology as well as in general systems engineering. MITRE 
is on the inside on present as well as future plans for all 
the electronic systems. Not only does MITRE have access to 
Air Force thinking, but the Air Force also has made available 
to them studies and proposals submitted by industry for evalu-
ation. 
In addition to its access to government furnished 
information, it is hoped that, because of its nonprofit nature, 
its noncompetitive position, and its close relationship with 
the Air Force, industry will voluntarily entrust MITRE with 
its latest technical knowhow including proprietary informa-
tion.28 As MITRE's stature increases and the weight of its 
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technical recommendations on future systems is more apparent, 
these inputs should greatly increase. Industry will realize 
that they must initiate technical meetings with MITRE if they 
are to sell their ideas and their business to the Air Force. 
To encourage the exchange of technical ideas, MITRE 
has set up written and fairly comprehensive policy and admin-
istrative procedures for the control of sensitive information. 
MITRE realizes that, because of its unusual position, much of 
the information received is privileged and often proprietary 
in nature. The improper disclosure of such information 
violates both legal and ethical standards. MITRE knows that 
if it is to do its job, it must have the latest up-to-date 
knowledge of industry and that this information can be obtain-
ed only if industry is confident that MITRE will act in an 
ethical manner. Any breach of conduct in this area by MITRE 
employees could rapidly break down hard-won relationships. 
Therefore, administrative and educational actions have been 
taken to assure that:29 
1. MITRE employees are aware of the legal 
and ethical considerations implicit in 
possessing such information. 
2. Only a minimum number of employees, clearly 
having a need to know, will share the 
information. 
Ability to Control Size and Aspirations of the Nonprofit 
The proponents of the nonprofits claim that the 
strong tendency of private corporations to grow can be contrary 
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to the best interests of the Air Force in certain instances. 
Congressional reports illustrate this point in the case where 
the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation was employed as the systems 
engineer on the ballistic missile programs. Ramo-Wooldridge 
as a private contractor was not content to remain in the 
research and development and systems engineering business 
despite the lucrative profits earned. It insisted instead 
on expanding its efforts into hardware production where it 
felt that greater profits could be made. 30 
This insistence led to the creation of Space 
Technology Laboratories as a separate corporation wholly 
owned by Ramo-Wooldridge but separated from its other commer-
cial efforts. To further insure objectivity, the Air Force 
was forced to impose a hardware ban on Ramo-Wooldridge to 
prevent its development and production of any components for 
ballistic missiles unless specifically approved by the Air 
Force. 31 
The Ramo-Wooldridge position was further complicated 
by the influence of Thompson Products which had provided Ramo-
Wooldridge with financial assistance and other guarantees in 
return for 49 per cent of its common stock and other con-
siderations. These companies were merged in 1958 to improve 
Thompson Products' production and engineering capabilities 
by using the competence built up by Ramo-Wooldridge. In the 
process of merger, efforts were made to isolate completely 
55 
the Space Technology activities from Thompson Ramo-Wooldridge. 
However, a very significant feature of the merger is the fact 
that eleven of the fourteen top executives of Ramo-Wooldridge, 
including Doctors Ramo and Wooldridge, went to Thompson Ramo-
Wooldridge. As a result the Air Force lost from its critically 
important projects the top scientists and managers upon whose 
presence the selection of Ramo-Wooldridge was initially pred-
icated:.; for the highly important position as the ballistic 
missile systems engineer. 32 
It has often been stated that the growth problem, 
as outlined above, will not be so difficult in a nonprofit. 33 
While this is probably true in the sense that there will not 
be stockholders pushing for profits, the personal desire of 
individuals to expand the nonprofit for their own benefits 
still exists. 34 Any corporation headed by the high-level 
scientific and management personnel required in a top-flight 
organization of this type will have a driving interest in 
expanding its operations and be part of a growing organiza-
tion.35 This natural type of growth is demonstrated by the 
manner in which the Systems Development Corporation expanded 
its activities into many projects where its human engineering 
and computer programming capabilities were in high demand. 
(See Figure 3) 
The nonprofit itself may not be directly responsible 
for much of its growth. A quick look at the MITRE build-up 
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will clearly show that as the Air Force's responsibilities 
at Hanscom Field expanded, the size of MITRE increased 
accordingly. It was only natural to give new tasks to MITRE 
as the overall job increased. That this type of growth must 
be closely monitored was expressed by Secretary of the Air 
Force Eugene Zuckert in a policy statement on nonprofits 
where he stated: 36 
We look on these nonprofit corporations to 
focus the nation's finest scientific and 
technical talents on selected and highly 
sophisticated taSks. They must not become 
convenient catchalls for projects which could 
be performed by private industry; the elite 
nature of their technical staffs must be 
preserved. Any dilution of the select quality 
of these organizations can only have an ad-
verse effect on their ability to carry out 
vital Air Force work. 
Other very definite dangers of uncontrolled ex-
pansion were forcefully stated in a recent congressional 
report on nonprofit Aerospace: 37 
Nevertheless, Aerospace shares with all viable 
institutions, governmental and otherwise, the 
propensity for empire building. As tasks 
multiply and the emoloyment roster grows, the 
"elite" auality of the technical staff inevitably 
suffers. The larger the organization, the more 
unwieldy and bureaucratic it becomes. The Air 
Force and Aerospace will have to guard afZainst 
the self-defeating consequences of corporate 
expansion. 
While unlimited growth may defeat the purpose for 
which the nonprofit was formed, complete restraint may have 
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an equally devastating effect. The type of scientific and 
engineering people we need can be recruited only into a growing 
organization. MITRE is a case in point. MITRE is an organi-
zation predominently staffed by young scientists. Unless the 
corporation can hold out the possibility of advancement to 
those already hired as well as to candidates for recruitment, 
the men with the drive required to do the job will look else-
where for employment. This was illustrated some time ago 
when MITRE had difficulty holding its people when its growth 
was in doubt. This problem disappeared when its expanded 
mission was announced. 
It would appear that the nonprofits are faced with 
a dilemma. Unless they grow they cannot attract and hold top 
people. If they grow unrestrictedly they lose their elite 
qualities. Where do they go from here? It's possible that 
the government will step in and put a ceiling on this type of 
operation in the same manner in which it controls the size 
of the military and civil service. 
Retention of Highly Skilled Scientists and Engineers 
An unquestionable benefit arising from using a 
government sponsored nonprofit is the greater probability 
that trained personnel with systems experience can be retained 
for use on other Air Force projects. This assurance is quite 
different from past experience with Ramo-Wooldridge and other 
private contractors. 
As pointed out previously, Thompson Ramo-Wooldridge 
utilized the competence which Ramo-Wooldridge had developed 
in the missile area to build up its capabilities in other 
production areas. In the merger with Ramo-Wooldridge and 
the split-off of Space Technology Laboratories in 1958, it 
siphoned off most of the top scientific and managerial talent 
which had been built up by Ramo-Wooldridge at considerable 
cost in time and dollars. In other words, the Air Force 
management contract was a means of building experience which 
was utilized to benefit other corporate enterprises when it 
appeared financially beneficial to the corporation to do so. 38 
This is not to say that private contractor systems-
oriented personnel are necessarily lost to the Air Force. 
The opposite would probably be the rule since a contractor 
would normally try to use this experience as an asset for 
obtaining future contracts. The Ramo-Wooldridge procedure 
is probably an extreme case; however, the fact remains that 
if an individual will benefit the corporation more in a new 
position, he will probably be shifted. 
Loss of personnel to corporate commercial enterprises 
could not take place in a corporation such as MITRE which is 
committed by its charter to work exclusively for the government. 
Training a competent systems-oriented scientist or engineer 
requires years of experience. Competent systems men are 
valuable resources which the Air Force can ill-afford to lose. 
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This experience must be available for follow-on systems 
and the nonprofit seems to provide insurance that this 
problem will not occur. 
Use of Associate Contractors 
Under the concept envisioned by many who favor the 
nonprofit system engineer, it will be possible for the govern-
ment to enter into direct contracts with each of the major 
subsystems and equipment contractors who are associated with 
the system. In a sample electronic system this means that 
separate contracts would be let for the radars, communications, 
computers, displays and any other equipments or subsystems 
which it considers major. 
This procedure would permit the government, with 
the advice and recommendations of MITRE, to select the con-
tractor in each of these areas which it felt could best do 
the job rather than relying on subcontracting by an overall 
prime system contractor. These direct contracts would give 
the Air Force greater controls and better access to each of 
these contractors than is normally the case with subcontracts. 
It is also claimed that savings are made through eliminating 
a tier of contracting and avoiding the payment of fees to a 
prime contractor for his subcontracted work. 
It must be pointed out, however, that along with 
these seeming advantages, the Air Force will also be buying 
a big crop of headaches. In the first place, the Air Force-
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nonprofit team must be composed of highly competent managers 
to insure that all parts of the system are compatible in 
every detail and that all the various contractors produce 
their parts of the system on schedule. The intimate detail 
required of the systems engineer would pose a tremendously 
tedious workload which does not appear to be in consonance 
with the elite quality of personnel. 
It would appear, if any reasonable time schedule 
is to be met, that the system engineer would be required to 
have liaison personnel at each of the major contractor's 
plants and on the sites where assembly is made in order to 
get the proper feedbacks. This would be mandatory if the 
equipment being produced is of a development nature where 
constant changes are the order of the day and each change 
affects numerous other subsystems. 
When feedbacks occurred, contractual changes would 
be required with each contractor affected. This itself would 
be a time-consuming bottleneck, as anyone who had dealt with 
government procurement procedures would clearly recognize. 
The early ballistic missile program has often been cited as 
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an example of the benefits gained by the associate contractor 
method; however, an examination of this program indicates many 
procurement leniencies allowed in order to expedite the program. 
These would be difficult to justify today.39 
The economy features of associate contracting could 
also be challenged. Competitive procurement for each subsystem 
or major equipment would be time-consuming as well as involv-
ing elaborate proposals from many contractors for each major 
equipment,* expensive source selection meetings, and lengthy 
contractual negotiations. These items all cost money even 
though they do not show up as direct contract costs. 
It is interesting to note that on the NORAD Control 
System, which is the pioneer system utilizing MITRE as the 
system engineer, the associate contractor method is not being 
used. 
Lack of Competitive Drive 
It was stated in congressional hearings which 
recommended transforming Space Technology Laboratories into 
a nonprofit that the Air Force must realize that a different 
f 1 1 .41 type o company wou d evo ve. 
The aggressive profitmaking drive, better suited 
to a production company, would be replaced by 
a auieter sense of dedication to scientific 
pursuits and Government service. 
The lack of competitive drive, many believe, will 
prove a distinct liability to the nonprofit. Competition 
and the possibility of personal gain are usually claimed to 
*Fifty to sixty thousand dollars for a single proposal from 
each of a dozen or so interested corporations bidding for a 
fairly large contract seems to be a fair estimate. These 
costs could go much higher on a large multi-million dollar 
program.40 
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be the major incentives which make the American way of life 
possible. As an example, Dr. Ramo, because of his scientific 
and executive abilities, was able to parlayan initial $6750 
investment in 1953 into profits valued at over $3,150,000 by 
1958. 42 After the inc·entives to greater profits were lost, 
Dr. Ramo left the program and went to greener pastures. 
Competition among electronics companies for systems 
work is very keen. Before a contract is awarded, a company 
must demonstrate by past performance and present capabilities 
that it can do a good job. If mediocre or poor performance 
is apparent, a contractor can rest assured that he will be 
penalized in future procurements. He knows, and all his 
personnel know, that they must perform well if they are to 
survive. 
While "dedication to scientific pursuits and Govern-
ment service" is nice flagwaving phraseology, it is doubtful 
if these motives during peacetime will ever replace the drive 
which intense competition creates. 
Divided Responsibility 
A major drawback of the nonprofit system engineering 
approach is the division of responsibility which violates the 
very concept of systems management. This co~ept envisions 
that if long systems lead times are to be reduced and red 
tape cut, complete authority for the design, development, and 
production of an entire system must be vested in a single 
organization. 43 
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It is probable that many of the same problems will 
arise here as those which hampered the production of complex 
weapons systems prior to the system concept. Under early 
programs, many of the equipments and components to be used 
in an aircraft system were purchased by separate Air Force 
offices and furnished to the airframemanufacturer. 44 Since 
he was not responsible for the design, devlopment or manu-
facture of what went into his system, the aircraft manufacturer 
could not be held responsible for production delays or factors 
which prevented the subsystem from fitting and operating 
properly in the environment in which it was placed. The more 
complex the systems, the more the problems of interface and 
compatibility. 45 
To overcome these problems, more and more detailed 
specifications and integration factors were given to the 
contractors. These required laborious changing whenever a 
contractor wished to incorporate a technical improvement into 
his equipment. Coordinating committees sprang up to review 
and approve recommended changes. This further lengthened 
the cycle and increased the red tape snarls. As a result, 
systems were often not as advanced as the latest state-of-the-
art would allow; moreover, they were often obsolete before 
they were produced. 46 
This method of operating was finally forced out 
because the in-house engineering capabilities could not keep 
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up with the rapid technological advances being made. It just 
became impossible to provide the type of engineering specifica-
tion and guidance required when many equipment and subsystem 
contractors each developed and produced their bit for the overall 
subsystem. 47 
As contemplated by some in the use of a nonprofit 
corporation for systems engineering, the Air Force will again 
become essentially its own systems engineer. It is envisioned 
that the nonprofit will operate as a staff agency for the Air 
Force and the Air Force will attempt to direct a number of 
associate contractors, each producing his part to be married 
into the system. All changes desired or required will again 
revert to the Air Force for resolution. Where changes affect 
other subsystems, modifications to other contractors' efforts 
and numerous time-consuming contractual changes will be required. 
Most important of all, no one contractor will be 
responsible to produce a given system by a given date. The 
contractor selected to install the equipment into an integrated 
whole will have a built-in excuse for delay if the subsystems 
are not delivered on time or do not integrate and function 
properly. The subsystem supplier will piously state that he 
delivered his part according to specifications. 
No modern system, with its enormous complexities, 
is ever put together without problems of this sort. The 
System Program Director needs one contractor to hold responsible 
for resolution of these problems and not a half-dozen, each 
pointing to the others as the source of the trouble. 
Proven Competence and Experience of Private Corpor.ations 
The electronic systems area presents a picture of 
proven industry competence to engineer and produce complica-
ted systems to meet tight time-schedules. All three segments 
of the DEW Line have been delivered to the Air Force and are 
operating. The Greenland and Alaskan BMBWS sites have been 
turned over to the Air Defense Command along with their 
extensive rearward communications, and the last SAGE sector 
went into operation recently. 
In addition to systems completed, numerous other 
systems are in various stages of study, development and 
production by corporations which represent a cross-section 
of the electronics industry. As the system approach spread 
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to include more and more systems, the entire industry recognized 
this new method of management and geared itself for it. In 
most cases the major contractors set up soecial systems-oriented 
organizations for the exclusive purpose of systems engineering 
and management in direct response to the Air Force demand. 
It would seem irresponsible if the Air Force were 
now to abandon a proven approach and not utilize the experience, 
as well as engineering and management capabilities, which have 
been assembled and developed at great cost. If we are to move 
forward, we must use the experience accumulated by past ex-
perience and all the potential which is available. 
In its recommendations on missile management, it 
was pointed out by the Milliken Committee,* that, as contractors 
developed the competence required to manage complicated systems, 
responsibilities for these systems should be given to them. 
In the electronics area the Air Force is apparently following 
just the opposite procedure and transferring responsibility 
from proven industrial resources to an unproven nonprofit 
corporation. 
Pay Scales 
In discussions of nonprofits, comparative pay scales 
between the nonprofits, industry and the military are usually 
emphasized. It is stressed that the competitive pay scales 
of the nonprofits allow them to hire the talent they reauire 
to do the job. At the same time it is claimed that the low 
military and civil service's pay prevents their attracting the 
people they need. 
An attempt was made to make a comparative study of 
salaries paid by the nonprofits, industry, the military and 
civil service actually engaged in electronic systems engineer-
ing and management to verify or disprove these statements. 
Military and civil service pay scales are public information; 
* A special committee selected by the Secretary of the Air 
Force and headed by Dr. Clark B. Milliken, director of the 
Gugenheim Aeronautical Laboratory, California Institute of 
Technology, for the purpose of examining and evaluatin~ the 
Air Force Ballistic missile organization.48 -
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however, material from industrial and nonprofit contractors 
was difficult to obtain and was given to the author with the 
definite understanding that it be considered company con-
fidential and not published. Therefore, the information 
presented below is primarily that available from public sources. 
Nonprofit Salaries 
The nonprofit which has been in the limelight more 
than any other is Aerospace. Because of the public scrutiny 
which it has been under, its general salary structure is given 
in fairly recent congressional reports. Part of this informa-
tion has been extracted and is shown in Table V. These 
salaries clearly indicate that the Aerospace pay scale is 
well above the national average for engineers according to 
nationwide statistics prepared by the Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics as shown in Table VI. However, 
because of the high caliber of its personnel, with a large 
percentage holding Doctor and Master degrees, it is difficult 
to make any direct comparison between Aerospace and the overall 
engineering field. What is much more significant is that 
when Aerospace was formed, scientific and engineering personnel 
were wooed away from industry and the universities by salary 
increases which averaged 8 per cent. 49 Considering the 
average Aerospace salaries, this indicates an average raise 
of about a thousand dollars per year. Is it any wonder that 
industry grumbles about pirating when they lose many of their 
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TABLE V 
AEROSPACE SALARIES 
Title Number 
Minimum 
Cor;Eorate Administration 
President 1 
Senior Vice President 1 
Vice Presidents 4 $27,.500 
Ofi'ice oi' the President 5 21,500 
Technical Divisions 
Line Supervisors Reporting 
to Vice Presidents 18 
2nd Level Supervisors 45 
Stai'i' Scientists to 
Above 19 
All Other Members of 
Technical Staff' 370 
Source - House Report No. 324 
Date - May 1, 1961 
20,000 
14,000 
9,400 
8,000 
• 
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Annual Salary 
Maximum A:verage 
$75,000 
50,000 
$45,000 39,12.5 
28,000 24,100 
30,000 26,094 
30,000 18,622 
29,000 19,662 
21,,500 13,864 
TABLE VI 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 
ENGINEERS SALARY DATA 
Number Mean Nean 
or Monthly Annual 
Employees Salaries Salaries 
Engineers I 9,828 $ 548 ~ 6,576 
Engineers II 30,873 609 7,308 
Engineers III 64,671 705 8,460 
Engineers IV 71,637 832 9,984 
Engineers v 39,056 960 11,520 
Engineers VI 18,669 1,114 13,368 
Engineers VII 5,424 1,373 16,476 
Engineers VIII 1,217 1,588 19,056 
Note: Engineer classirications general characteristics shown 
on rollowing page. 
Source - National Survey or Proressional, Administrative, 
Technical, and Clerical Pay Winter 1960-61, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, October 1961. 
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TABLE VI SUPPLEMENT 
ENGINEER GENERAL GHARAC~ERISTICS 
Engineer I - As the beginning level of engineering work, 
a bachelor's degree in engineering or equivalent is 
required. Typically receives formal classroom or on-
the-job training. 
Engineer II - At this continuing developmental level, performs 
routine engineering work requiring application of standard 
techniques, procedures, and criteria in carrying out a 
sequence of related engineering tasks. Limited exercise 
of judgment is required on details of work. May receive 
advanced on-the-job or classroom instructions. 
Engineer III - Work requires independent evaluation, selec-
tion, and application of standard engineering techniques, 
procedures, and criteria, using judgment and ingenuity 
in making minor adaptations and modifications. 
Engineer IV - Work requires originality and judgment in the 
independent evaluation, selection, and substantial 
adaptation and modification of standard techniques, 
procedures, and criteria. Is recognized as fully com-
petent in all conventional aspects of the subject-
matter or functional area of assignments. 
Engineer V - Work requires application of intensive and 
diversified knowledge of engineering principles and 
practices in broad areas of assignments and related 
fields. Makes decisions independently on engineering 
problems and methods, and represents the organization 
in conferences to resolve important questions and to 
plan and coordinate work. Positions may be supervisory 
or nonsupervisory. 
Engineer VI - Work is characterized by full technical respon-
sibility for interpreting, organizing, executing, and 
coordinating assignments. Maintains liaison with other 
organizations or companies. Positions may be supervisory 
or nonsupervisory. 
Engineer VII - Work is characterized by decisions and recommen-
dations which are recognized as authoritative and have 
an important impact on extensive engineering activities. 
Initiates and maintains extensive contacts with key 
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engineers and o£ficials o£ other organizations and 
companies; this requires skill in persuasion and nego-
tiations of critical issues. Positions may be super-
visory or nonsupervisory. 
Engineer VIII - Work is characterized by authoritative decisions 
and recommendations which have a far-reaching impact on 
extensive engineering andrelated activities of the 
company. Negotiates critical and controversial issues 
with top level engineers and officers of other organiza-
tions and companies. Positions may be supervisory or 
nonsupervisory. 
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highly prized scientific and engineering personnel to the 
nonprofits? 
In all fairness to MITRE and SDC it should be 
emphasized that the Aerospace salaries shown are not necessarily 
representative of all the nonprofits.* MITRE insists that, 
while its salaries are competitive, it is not pay scales 
above industry which attract people to MITRE; rather it is 
the type of work they are doing and the environment in which 
they work. In discussions of this matter with the SDC 
personnel manager who is recruiting in this area, he claimed 
that salaries offered by SDC are a major reason for candi-
dates' refusing employment. Be this as it may, if the non-
profits are seeking the best men available to do the job, 
something good must be offered to attract people from their 
present positions. 
Private:Engineering Salaries 
During the winter of 1960-61 the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics conducted the second of an annual series of nation-
wide surveys of salaries paid to selected occupations. This 
*President Kennedy has directed David Bell, Budget Bureau 
Director, to make an investigation into the use of the nonprofit 
contractors in direct federal operations. The report of this 
investigation, when published, will, in all liklihood, contain 
salary information on MITRE and SDC in a manner similar to 
that shown in Table V. This "Bell Committee" report was to 
have been submitted no later than December 1, 1961; however, 
lates5t indications are that it will be delayed until March 1962. 0 
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study provides broadly based information which is to be used 
in appraising the salaries of government civil service employees 
in relation to private industry compensation. The salary 
data collected does not include data on supplementary benefits 
such as paid vacations, paid holidays, health insurance and 
pension plans. 
Only portions of the data dealing with engineering 
have been extracted and are presented in Table VI. 
Military Salaries 
As shown in Table VII the military starting salary, 
including all pay and allowances, for a young engineer fresh 
out of college and not on flying status is a mere $355.68 
per month, provided he is married. If he is single, the 
figure would drop to $338.58. He could not expect to top 
$700.00 a month until promoted to major after about thirteen 
years of service. If he were fortunate enough to go through a 
flying school and become rated he would fare better, but 
this road isn't open to many, and a young engineer or scientist 
may have no desire to spend his time as a crew member. Of 
course, there are other benefits which accrue to the military, 
such as tax exemption on quarters and subsistence allowances, 
free medical care, exchange and commissary privileges, and 
retirement benefits. However, these benefits do not mean 
much to a heaLthy young engineer fresh out of college with 
industry knocking at his door with lucrative pay offers. 
TABLE VII 
AIR FORCE omCERS' MONTHLY PAY RATES 
1 With Dependents, Nonrated , Including Housing and Subsistence 
Cumulative Years of Service2 
Title Under 2 Over 1:t OverS Over 12 Over 16 Over 20 Over- 26 
Colonel $777 $S54 $854 $854 $984 $1044 $1169 
Lt. Colonel 658 724 724 774 S64 929 959 
Major 567 622 652 717 777 797 797 
Captain 476 565 610 660 675 675 675 
1st Lt. 401 512 52~ 522 522 522 522 
2nd Lt. 355 447 447 447 447 447 447 
1. Rated officers on flying status draw additional incentive pay of $100 to $245 per month depending 
on rank and length of service. 
2. Incremental pay raises exist other than shown 
Source - u. S • Air Force 
Date - January 1962 
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While pay scales start out low in the military, 
they do improve as an officer acauires more seniority and 
rank. After twenty years of service he should have gained 
the rank of Lt. Colonel or Colonel and be earning between 
$11,156 and $15,728 per year. 
Civil Service Salaries 
The young engineer entering civil service appears 
to do a little better when starting his career. If he is 
in the top third of his class he can start in the middle of 
the GS-7 grade earning $5,850 per year or $487.50 per month. 
After three to four years, with good promotion luck he can 
be making 746.25 per month at the first step of a GS-12 (See 
Table VIII). After this, promotions are likely to be slower. 
At this time the predominent grade in the Electronic Systems 
Division is GS-13 with pay ranging from $10,635 to $11,~35 
per year; however, ESD civilians are usually experienced 
engineers, most of whom hold the higher grades. 
Although the GS rating system goes as high as GS-18, 
only one man in ESD has reached the GS-16 level. Four others 
are employed under public law 313 which allows salaries up 
to $1Y,OOO per year. Yossibly the biggest drawback in civil 
service is not the pay scales per se, but the lack of oppor-
tunity to fill the more responsible management positions. In 
ESD, as in many military organizations, the top management 
jobs are filled by military. The road to the top is practically 
nonexistent for the civilian. 
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TABLE VIII 
FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE PAY RATES 
(Monthly Pay Rates to Nearest Dollar) 
Grade Annual Honthly 
GS-5 $ 4345 - 5335 $ 362 - 445 
GS-7 5355 - 6345 4J+6 - 529 
GS-9 6435 - 7425 536 - 619 
GS-11 7560 - 8860 630 - 738 
GS-12 8955 - 10,255 746 - 855 
GS-13 10,635 - 11,935 886 - 995 
GS-14 12,210 - 13,510 1,117 - 1,126 
GS-15 13,730 - 15,030 1,14J+ - 1,252 
GS-16 15,255 - 16,295 1,271 - 1,358 
GS-17 16,530 - 17,570 1,377 - 1,464 
GS-18 18,500 1,542 
Note: Up to seven step rates exist in each grade based on 
time in grade. Only lowest and top salaries in each 
grade shown 
Source - Federal Civil Service Grades and Salary Rates 
Date - February 1962 - Rates shown presently in effect. 
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Statistics indicate that there is usually very little 
loss of civilians at the middle pay grades where the salary 
range does not appear to be too far off the national average. 
However, engineers at the lowest and higher grades are most 
apt to leave government employ. The former usually leave for 
higher pay offers and the latter because they have what it 
takes to climb the higher rungs of management and into the 
higher pay scales which are too often denied them in civil 
service. 
Summary 
Both the military and civil service salary scales 
have obvious weaknesses which prevent the government from 
competing effectively pay-wise with either private industry 
or the nonprofits for top engineering and scientific personnel. 
Starting salaries are considerably below the national average 
which makes it very difficult to either attract or retain the 
higher caliber new college graduate. The pay differential 
does not appear to be too great in the intermediate brackets 
if the fringe benefits of the military are given full consid-
eration. However, present law does not permit adequate 
compensation at the top of the ladder in either the military 
or civil service for the high caliber individuals who can 
move into much better paying positions in private industry 
or the nonprofits. 
The inadequacies of the present government salary 
structures are a difficult obstacle to the Air Force manager 
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who is trying to build and maintain a high caliber, technically 
oriented organization reauired for system management. If 
young men cannot be induced into government careers and the 
top managerial and scientific talent is constantly being 
siphoned off by industry, the problem will become even more 
acute in the future. 
The problem is recognized at the highest levels. 
President Kennedy recently requested substantial pay raises 
for government civil service white collar workers. He stated 
that he wants, "Federal pay reform, not simply a Federal pay 
raise." He proposes to put government workers on a comparable 
basis with those not in federal service and cites pay adjust-
ments for top executives and those in professional positions 
as, "The most vital single element," of his program. 51 
In-House Government Capability 
There are many who contend that if the government 
faces facts squarely, it will insist that the Air Force build 
up its own capability to perform the jobs now being delegated 
to Aerospace and MITRE. 52 They believe that these contract 
agencies are performing functions which only the government 
itself can properly discharge.53 
It should be pointed out here that the Air Force 
is not devoid of scientific and engineering personnel. As 
of February 28, 1961, the Air Research and Development Command 
alone had a total of 8,805 scientific and engineering people 
in its command organizations, laboratories, and test centers. 
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This figure includes 4,172 military and 4,633 civilians, many 
of whom hold advanced degrees. In addition, the command 
contained 37,736 mission support personnel about equally 
divided between military and civilians. These support 
personnel include professionally or technically trained 
persons assisting the scientists and engineers in such areas 
as test operations, instrumentation, experimental fabrication, 
and data computation, as well as management people concerned 
with programming, budgeting, contracting, manpower, and other 
support functions. The above figures ouite overshadow the 
management and operating contractors, both profit and non-
profit, employed by ARDC at that time. Their muster included 
3,741 scientists and engineers and 17,404 technicians and 
mission support personne1. 54 
The Air Force is not standing still in attempting 
to increase its scientific potential. At the present time 
2,000 officers annually enter the Air Force Institute of 
Technology (AFIT) programs.55 These programs are usually 
one or two years in length, predominently in the scientific 
and engineering areas, and normally lead to bachelor or gradu-
ate level degrees from the nation's leading universities or 
AFIT's own reco~nized resident engineering school. Plans are 
now being considered to double these programs with emphasis 
on sending many newly commissioned officers directly to 
graduate school.56 
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However, the Air Force benefits from these educa-
tional programs are fairly short-lived. If a young officer, 
fresh out of ROTC, is sent back to graduate school for two 
years at full pay with all school expenses paid, his maximum 
commitment to the service is only three years following 
schooling, except in cases of national emergency. With 
industry and the nonprofits offering fancy salaries, most will 
probably leave at the first opportunity. The Air Force 
probably gets a better payoff from sending a captain with about 
ten years service on to graduate school. By that time future 
benefits usually hold him until he reaches the minimum twenty 
years of service reauired for retirement. 
The archaic retirement laws induce many of the 
particularly competent officers to retire at twenty years 
rather than later. Except for generals, an officer is stat-
u~orily forced out at twenty-eight to thirty years service 
regardless of his aualifications or dedication. Even though 
his pay may be livable after twenty years ($11,156 - $15,728 
per year), and his job rewarding, he realizes that he will 
have to start a new career on the outside if he is to support 
and educate his family. Many believe this will be easier to 
do at age 40 - 45 than at 50 - 55. If a realistic retirement 
plan can be formulated to allow retirement at 60 or 65, 
many key managers would probably give 15 to 20 years additional 
service to the Air Force. 
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The possibilities of increasing in-house potential 
in the civilian areas do not appear too bright either. While 
it is probably true that government civil service pay scales 
are not all they could be, the constant carping at governmental 
salaries and the left-handed inference that civil service 
employees are necessarily a mediocre and low level lot has 
not made the task of the government recruiter an easy one. 
Many highly competent and dedicated government employees 
are presently d~ing an excellent job in such organizations 
as the Electronic Systems Division in spite of the fact that 
the country tries to put them in the category of second class 
citizens. A program aimed at improving the image of govern-
ment service rather than holding it up for ridicule would 
result in a more constructive situation, and there would be 
a much better chance of improving the Air Force in-house 
capability in spite of the poor pay and other statutmry 
stumbling blocks. 
The present personnel structure of the Electronic 
Systems Division also endangers its future effectiveness. 
Practically all engineerin~ jobs in ESD can be filled only 
with experienced personnel at the GS-12 or higher level. 
There are few if any openings in the lower grades which 
permit the hiring and training of young college graduates 
for future responsible systems management positions. Because 
of this situation experienced personnel must either be 
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recruited from other government agencies or hired direct 
from industry or the universities. 
How can civil service compete for the top experienced 
engineers and scientists if the nonprofit offers as good or 
higher salaries, better working conditions, an academic 
environment, greater job prestige and more advancement 
opportunities. Like civil service, they also have a less 
competitive atmosphere than is often found in private industry, 
job security, and a sense of dedication to the country's 
defense efforts. 
MITRE also realizes that it must train young men 
for fut~e responsible positions and offers excellent oppor-
tunities to the top college graduates. As shown in Table 
IV, 29.4 per cent of its technical staff has under five years 
experience. Promotion opportunities for these men appear 
to be excellent and the higher positions to which they can 
aspire pay much better than a top government scientist can 
ever hope for. 
It appears certain that if present pay and personnel 
policies continue unchanged, the civil service engineering 
and scientific component of ESD will gradually deteriorate 
rather than increase in effectiveness. A hard core of older 
workers will remain with the government for some time since 
most cannot afford to change jobs. However, some of the top 
men will continue to leave, retirements will take their toll, 
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and no young group is being readied to fill the gap. If the 
jobs can be filled at all i t·.is doubtful if the desired 
quality can be obtained. The Air Force is producing a situa-
tion where, like it or not, it will be forced to rely even 
more heavily upon the services and knowhow of the nonprofits 
and industry for future electronic systems. 
That an in-house capability can be built up, given 
time and the proper environment, is illustrated by the Aeron-
autical SystemsDivision of the Systems Command at Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, This organization has systems 
responsibility for aircraft and certain missiles in a manner 
similar to the Electronic Systems Division at ~anscom Field, 
and the Ballistics Missile and Space Systems Divisions on 
the West Coast. On February 28, 1961, the Wright Air Develop-
ment Division, which since has been consolidated with certain 
elements of the Air Materiel Command to form the Aeronautical 
Systems Division, had a total of 901 military and 2,329 
civilian scientists and engineers. 57 Neither General Shriever, 
in his 1960 testimony before the subcommittee of the Committee 
on Government Operations, 58 nor Mr. Max Golden, General 
Counsel of the Air Force, in an address given September 14, 
196159 indicatesthe need to set up a nonprofit corporation 
to supplement the Aeronautical Systems Division. It should 
be noted, however, that the systems concept of management 
was first developed for aeronautical systems a number of 
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years ago, and the reservoir of qualified personnel has been 
growing at Wright-Patterson since before World War II. Also, 
there has been no colocation with a nonprofit nor competi-
tion of this type for personnel. 
While many arguments can be given pro or con as to 
development of an in-house capability, the fact remains that 
the Air Force now requires capabilities in the electronic 
systems area above t~ which it now possesses. "And if the 
Air Force does not have the reauisite resources and capabil-
ities to fulfill its requirements and meet its obligations, 
it must get them as best it can. 60 The Air Force has deter-
mined that it can best fill its need through the nonprofit 
corporations. Future congressional and other governmental 
investigations will undoubtedly attempt to determine if this 
was the best course of action. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Just as it is certain that rapid technological 
advances will continue to be made and that future electronic 
systems will grow in complexity, it is equally predictable 
that government sponsored nonprofit corporations will continue 
to grow in size and importance in the years to come, unless 
checked by governmental actions. As the complexity of the 
electronic systems grow, the Air Force's need for highly com-
petent scientific and engineering personnel will grow at an 
equal or greater rate. Since it is apparent that, at least 
for the foreseeable future, the military and civil service 
will not be able to meet all these needs, it will become 
increasingly convenient to call more and more upon the services 
of the nonprofit. The fact that the nonprofit has been en-
dorsed at high government level will hasten this trend. 
Because of its propensity toward greater objectivity 
than can normally be expected of many commercial contractors 
and direct sponsorship by the government, the nonprofit has 
been entrusted with much privileged military and commercial 
information which cannot be made available to the competitive 
contractor or exchanged between competitive contractors. 
Because of this unique situation, the nonprofit can be advan-
tageously used in many areas to increase the scientific and 
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engineering potential of the Air Force where use of a commer-
cial contractor would be impossible, impractical, or subject 
to severe criticism. 
At the same time, it should be clearly recognized 
that private industry is the backbone of past and current 
electronic system desi~, development and production. No 
actions should be taken which will deny the full utilization 
of this great potential on future systems. The nonprofit 
must not be used to reolace private industry where it has 
a demonstrated capability to perform but rather should be 
utilized in such a way that the effectiveness of the private 
contractor will be enhanced. 
Because of its privileged position and the high 
caliber of its personnel, the nonprofit should be of increas-
ing value in assisting the Air Force in its advanced planning, 
intersystem integration, and evaluation of na~ ideas. To 
do this job effectively the nonprofit must have unrestricted 
access to privileged governmental information. The Air Force 
should also encourage private industry to open its doors 
to the nonprofit. In this way the latest technical thinking 
from all sources can be made available and evaluated for use 
on present and future systems. In order for this technique 
to be effective, however, the nonprofit must demonstrate its 
worthiness of this trust by its ethical handling of privileged 
information and by strict impartiality and objectivity. 
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The nonprofit should also prove valuable as part 
of the System Program Office team on certain systems. The 
highest scientific and engineering experience available is 
required in this area to do the broad engineering necessary 
to develop a good engineering do~ument to submit to industry 
when requesting proposals and bids. This will tell industry 
more specifically what the Air Force wants in a system rather 
than being dependent upon industry to tell the Air Force 
what it should have. 
Besides performing this initial engineering, the 
nonprofit should remain an integrated part of the Systems 
Program Office team to assist in the evaluation of the contrac-
tor's engineering proposals submitted in response to the re-
quest for proposal, advise the Air Force in its direction of 
the selected contractor and assist in monitoring program pro-
gress and tests. In must be clearly established, however, 
that it is the System Program Director who is managing and 
directing the program and not the nonprofit. The nonprofit, 
as well as all other members of the System Program Office 
team, must be subject to and abide by the direction and deci-
sions of the Program Director. 
To derive the maximum benefits of the systems con-
cept of management and utilize most effectively the resources 
available in industry, the selected prime systems contractor 
should be responsible for complete and detailed systems en-
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gineering and the development, design, production and installa-
tion of the system subject to the general guidance and direc-
tion of the System Program Office. The use of associated 
contractors should be limited to those cases where conflict 
of interest would result, or where subsystems or eauipments 
already being developed and produced for other systems are 
usable in the new system. 
However, no hard-and-fast rules can be set and 
applied across the board on all systems. Instead, the con-
tractual arrangement must be that best suited to the particu-
lar system being considered. Inc ertain large systems it may 
prove practical to have more than one prime contractor if 
portions of the system are easily definable and integration 
problems minimal. The present BMEWS system is a case in point, 
where the Western Electric Company is responsible for rearward 
communications while RCA is prime for the remainder of the 
system. 
While the nonprofit is being hailed by many as a 
godsend to systems mana~ers, it should be recognized that 
it is not an unmixed blessing. Its problems and shortcomings 
will be making news following current and future congressional 
and other governmental investigation. Its business affairs 
as well as its technical capabilities will be under constant 
surveillance. Any breach of ethics or the unwise use of the 
nonprofit for efforts which could be performed by competitive 
industry will bring sharp criticism. 
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Any unnecessary expansion of the nonprofit with 
a probable dilution of the quality of personnel, must be 
carefully guarded against. It is already feared by some that 
the lack of competitive drive found in private corporations 
will weaken the nonorofits' operations. This shortcoming 
can only be overcome by careful selection of personnel of the 
highest caliber who have what it takes to push the job. 
Limitations of size may prove a difficult problem when dynamic, 
capable peoole are involved. However, a large, unwieldy, 
bureaucratic, empire-building, mediocre organization would 
d~feat the very purpose for which the nonprofit was sponsored. 
The nonprofit is as yet a relatively unproven 
management tool. Closer integration with the Air Force-
Industry team on all projects which it is supporting will not 
only make it more aware of the entire program and its problems, 
but will also give the nonprofits' personnel an excellent 
opportunity to demonstrate their capabilities. It must not 
set itself off in an ivory tower and expect that its high-
level academic degrees will win for it the recognition and 
prestige it must have to properly perform its job as a princi-
pal technical agency on major nationally important systems. 
While the Air Force should be able to improve its 
electronic systems management capability in ta:hnical areas 
with nonprofit support, it must not sit back and allow its 
own capabilities to deteriorate. Every effort must be made 
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to recruit and retain high quality scientific and engineering 
personnel in its military and civil service ranks. This will 
prove to be more difficult in the future because the close 
presence of the nonprofit with its higher salaries, greater 
chances for advancement, and better working environment will 
tend to discourage the young engineer from making the military 
or civil service a career. The Air Force must realize that 
as it depends more and more upon the nonprofit, it is in fact 
I jeopardizing its ability to improve its own in-house systems 
management capability. 
Where the government-sponsored nonprofit goes from 
here is impossible to predict. Its star is shining brightly 
at the present time, and it is hoped that, because of the 
national importance of the programs to which it is committed, 
it will live up to expectations. 
However, the progress and success of the Air Force 
electronics system programs will not necessarily be determined 
by a particular management system or any specific need of 
nonprofit and private contractors on the team. These may 
provide the tools which will make the job easier and enhance 
the probability of success, but in the end the progress made 
will be determined by the individuals selected to do the job. 
* As J. P. Molnar has so ably stated in his comments on ballistic 
missile management:61 
* Mr. J. P. Molnar, former head of the Sandia Corporation, 
when the above statement was written, is now Executive Vice 
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In the end, as in most things, the problem 
reduces to one of finding the proper lead-
ership -- people who have the technical 
background for judging technical problems, 
but also the feeling for organizational 
and production problems of driving a big 
job through to completion. But mostly it 
is a matter of guts, drive, a willingness 
to take risks, and an ability to persuade 
others of the merits of their approach. 
President of the Bell Telephone LabOratories. The Sandia 
Corporation is a Western Electric Company subsidiary es-
tablished to manage the Atomic. Energy Commission's Sandia 
Laboratory at Albuaueraue, New Mexico, on a nonprofit, no 
fee basis. 
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APPENDIX 
A SAMPLE 0 F SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT 
The Dew Line 
To illustrate what is involved in the management of 
a system and the influence of systems engineering, it might 
be well to examine the history of a relatively early system 
from its inception to completion. A good example, and the 
first system of this type to be .implemented using the system 
concept of management, is the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line. 
The DEW Main portion of this system cost over a half billion 
dollars and consists of a line of fifty-seven radar stations 
stretching across the northern shores of the North American 
Continent from ~oint Barrow, Alaska, to Cape Dyer on the Eastern 
edge of Baffin Island, Canada. It also includes the communica-
tions between stations and from the line back to civilization. 
The DEW Line also includes an Aleutian Extension to the west 
and an Eastern Extension across Greenland (see Figure 5). The 
purpose of this line is to provide that early warning of possible 
enemy bomber attack to Canadian and U. S. air defense forces 
which will give our defending forces the critically needed 
time to meet the attack. For the purpose of this paper, the 
Aleutian and Eastern Extensions will not be considered since 
they were implemented as separate later pro?rams. 
Early History 
The need for a DEW Line was first voiced by the 
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Summer Study Group which met under the sponsorship of Lincoln 
Laboratories in mid 1952 to study air defense problems. In 
December of that year a policy statement of the National 
Security Council recommending a DEW Line was approved by 
President Truman. 
Upon being given the go ahead, the Air Force asked 
the Western Electric Company and its associated Bell Telephone 
Laboratories to conduct studies and tests to determine the 
feasibility of constructing and operating such a line in the 
hostile Arctic environment. After they had determined the 
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most suitable radars and communications equipments then avail-
able, and had utilized the meager knowledge obtainable on Arctic 
construction, the Western Electric Company constructed an 
experimental line composed of several prototype stations 
along the Arctic Ocean coast line of Alaska. This line was 
test operated during the winter of 1953-1954. 
As a result of the Bell Laboratory studies and the 
Arctic tests, a decision was made to proceed in 1954 and a 
contract let in December of that year with the Western Electric 
Company. 
Air Force Management 
It was recognized by the Air Force that special 
management would be reouired for a project of this magnitude 
which was faced not only with great technical and environmental 
problems but also a tight time schedule which required comple-
tion by July 31, 1957. To meet this management need, the Air 
Force leaned heavily upon its experience in aircraft programs 
and organized a special project office for this purpose. In 
early 1955 the project office was colocated with the Western 
Electric Company in New York City. With Western Electric it 
operated as an Air Force-industry team on all DEW Line problems. 
This project office, along with a similar office set up for 
the SAGE system, was the forerunner of the present System 
Program Offices. 
System Engineering 
With a year and a half of studies and tests avail-
I 
able, systems engineerinr- proceeded in earnest. The decision 
was made to develop and produce a new radar which, while 
basically using proven designs, was especially adapted to 
limited manning for both operations a nd maintenance. To 
handle the long communications hauls back to civilization, work 
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was pushed to develop, test and produce a new ionospheric scatter 
radio. For reliable communications between sites, the then 
being developed tropospheric scatter radio was decided upon. 
Operations specifications reauired that aircraft flying below 
normal line-of-sight radar coverage must be detected so radar 
employing the doppler principle.was chosen for this purpose. 
And so the story went on the multitude of other items needed 
to complete the system. 
Site Selection 
Basic systems engineering called for a search radar 
station to be installed approximately every hundred miles 
with small intermediate doppler stations halfway between 
each of the large search radar stations. With these criteria, 
survey teams began the task of finding suitable locations 
for the sites. The selected locations not only had to meet 
the needs of the electronic eauipment but also had to be so 
located near suitable beaches as to permit unloading of con-
struction materials and supplies. In addition, natural re-
sources such as gravel for constructing foundation piers, 
roads and runways and a source of water must be conveniently 
available at each site. Much of the site surveying had to be 
done during the 1954-1955 winter months when ski eauipped 
aircraft, snowmobiles, and dog sleds could operate on the ice 
and snow. These teams traveled over 1,000,000 miles and 
reviewed more than 80,000 aerial photographs as part of the 
job of siting and mapping the DEW Line. 
Construction 
The Western Electric contract in this case included 
the construction of all the facilities re0uired for the job. 
Special prefabricated buildings to house all the electronic 
equipment, power plants, and personnel were designed especially 
for the arctic. Also the Western Electric civil engineers 
had the job of constructing gravel airstrips at most sites 
and helicopter pads at certain locations where the terrain 
just wouldn't permit an airstrip. Roads were built to the 
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airstrips and beaches, towers were constructed for the radar 
and other electronic gear, and fuel and water tanks and lines 
were installed. 
As an indication of the magnitude of this job it 
is estimated that over 9,600,000 cubic yards of gravel were 
produced. This would be enough to construct a road 18 feet 
wide and one foot thick from Jacksonville, Florida, to San 
Diego, California. Arctic airstrips covered 26,700,000 square 
feet or 625 acres. 46,000 tons of steel were used and 1,800 
piles were sunk into the permafrost. Enough direct generators 
were installed to produce 155,000 killowatt hours per day 
which would be enough to supply the needs of a city the size 
of Spokane, Washington. 62 
Development-Production 
To insure that the equipment being used on the DEW 
Line was the best that the state of the art would permit, many 
of the contracts for equipment were of a development-production 
nature. This not only produced production headaches with 
short time schedules to meet but also recuired constant 
monitorship by the systems engineers to insure that their 
requirements were met. 
Domestic Test Site 
Since the Arctic is no place to test equipment, an 
exact replica of the stations to be built in the north was 
constructed at Streeter, Illinois. This allowed the com-
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patibility testing of all equipment as a system and was the 
place where mistakes were discovered and changes made. In 
addition to its engineering value this site also later served 
as a training site for the crews who were to operate the 
equipment. 
Logistics 
While the technical aspects of the DEW Line were a 
challenge, the logistics problems were almost overwhelming. 
In addition to procuring all the technical equipment required, 
it was also necessary to plan for and procure the thousands 
of items reauired to make each site a self-sufficient Arctic 
station. This included diesel generators, trucks, tractors, 
kitchen and recreation equipment, and all the parts to keep 
them operating as well as food, clothing, medical supplies, 
and cigarettes. Everything from snow plows to ping pong balls 
was included in the program planning for there are no hardware 
stores or supermarkets in the Arctic if anything is overlooked. 
Procuring the equipment was one thing, but getting 
it north was another. Most construction camps were initially 
activated by flying the personnel in in light ski aircraft 
during the winter. This was followed by airdropping tractors 
to clear ice strips so that large C-124 aircraft could land 
with bulldozers, trucks, and other eauipment needed. 
While logistic statistics are often dull reading, 
the magnitude of this Arctic adventure can only be told in 
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the following manner:63 
To procure the equipment and material used 
on this job over 113,000 purchase orders 
totaling $347 million were issued to 4,650 
suppliers in the United States and Canada. 
459,000 tons of material, of which 140,400 
tons were shipped by air, were transported 
to the line by aircraft, naval convoy, cat 
train, and barge. 
75,000,000 gallons of petrolium products, 
enough to fill 9,375 tank cars in a train 
65 miles long, went north to the Arctic. 
50 Canadian and 31 U. S. commercial airlines, 
in the largest commercial airlift in history, 
delivered 120,300 tons of cargo on flights av-
eraging 720 miles during a 32 month period. 
22,000 tons of food in 1,000,000 containers, 
12 acres of bed sheets, 6 acres of rugs, 
and 3 miles of window shades made up part 
of the reauired supplies. 
100,000 copies of 600 different manuals were 
prepared for the operation and maintenance 
of the DEW Line. 
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